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Earlier this century, Pope Pius XII addressed the morality of artificial 
insemination in four allocutions.! In doing so, he laid a foundation for 
determining the morality of various technical means to achieve conception. 
They can be licit if they assist the conjugal act, and they are illicit if they 
replace the conjugal act. This teaching was further developed in the more 
recent instruction of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: 
Donum Vitae. 2 
The Magisterial teaching is clear: the technologies that assist the 
conjugal act can be licit; those that replace it are illicit. What is not clear, 
however, is how one determines whether a reproductive technology assists 
or replaces the conjugal act. For some technologies, such as in vitro 
fertilization, the determination is easy. They replace the conjugal act since 
there is no conjugal act at all , and fertilization occurs outside the mother' s 
body. Furthermore, the Magisterium has determined that certain 
procedures are illicit.3 Yet for other technologies, the determination 
remains difficult, and the Magisterium has not pronounced on their liceity. 
For example, reputable theologians faithful to Magisterial teaching are 
divided whether GIFT (Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer) assists or replaces 
the conjugal act, and the Magisterium has not determined its liceity. In a 
22 Linacre Quarterly 
press conference on the day Donum Vitae was promulgated, Bartholomew 
Kiely, SJ said, "The instruction does not pronounce a judgment on GIFT. 
It leaves it open to research by biologists and further discussion by 
theologians.,,4 Because it is not clear how to determine which technologies 
assist the conjugal act, Edward Vacek has noted that 
[w]e will have to await clarification from the Vatican on what kinds of 
medical interventions are permitted. A marital sexual act done with 
love is required. To some this implies two spatial criteria: the sperm 
must be ejaculated in the vagina, and fertilization must take place in the 
body of the woman. Clarification will be needed on whether the 
Instruction permits ova to be medically removed, on whether the sperm 
can be withdrawn from the vagina posl coilum, and on whether the 
sperm and ovum can then be inserted in the womb or in a fallopian 
tube. 5 
Therefore, clear criteria are needed to determine whether a reproductive 
technology assists or replaces the conjugal act. 
In this essay, I will strive to elucidate such criteria, thereby facilitating 
the application of the teaching of Donum Vitae. First, I will examine the 
recent discussion of reproductive technologies, primarily GrFTITOTS,6 to 
see how various authors determine whether a given reproductive 
technology assists or replaces the conjugal act. The most attention will be 
given to Peter Cataldo and Josef Seifert, who do in fact articulate criteria to 
determine the assistance to or replacement of the conjugal act. Other 
authors propose criteria implicitly by arguing for or against the liceity of 
various technical interventions . I will determine which criteria are 
unsuitable and need to be excluded by falsifying certain views. I will also 
determine which criteria are suitable by verifying and further developing 
other viewpoints. Second, I will propose various criteria that can be used 
to distinguish assistance to the conjugal act from replacement, and, third, I 
will apply these criteria to selected reproductive technologies. 
A. Proposed Criteria to Distinguish Assistance from Replacement 
1. A Natural Act oflntercourse 
Carlo Caffarra offers a rich anthropological meditation and then 
applies it to a moral evaluation of different reproductive technologies. 7 
When it comes to the question of criteria to determine whether a 
reproductive technology assists or replaces the conjugal act, the following 
passage is most pertinent: 
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What is ethically essential, then, is that between two spouses there 
be a true and proper conjugal act. This has already been demonstrated 
in the first part of the presentation. By "a true and proper conjugal 
act" should be understood "the activation of that capacity for sexual 
activity without which capacity, according to the theological and 
canonical doctrine of the Church, one would be up against the 
impediment of impotency ". 
From the ethical point of view, once this act has been posited, 
nothing else is required of the two spouses. Any subsequent recourse 
they may have to some artificial intervention amounts, therefore, to 
giving assistance to the procreative act which, insofar as it is a human 
act, has already in itself been completed. 8 
He requires just one criterion, a true and proper conjugal act . If this has 
been done, all other interventions can be considered as forms of assistance. 
However, Caffarra overlooks an important criterion advanced by 
Donum Vitae. The child must be the fruit of the conjugal act;9 that is, the 
conjugal act must be the principal cause of the child's conception. 
Nicholas Tonti-Filippini astutely observes that Donum Vitae not only 
requires that there must be a true and proper conjugal act, but also that the 
child conceived must be the fruit of the conjugal act. "That is to say, the 
conjugal act must have a direct causal relationship to the origin of new 
life." \O 
Thus, it is not simply enough to say that the conjugal act is completed. 
It is also pertinent whether the conjugal act is successful in causing 
conception. More specifically it is pertinent whether a technical means 
assists the conjugal act in causing conception or replaces it. According to 
Caffarra's criterion, if there is a natural act of intercourse, is it then 
guaranteed that the conjugal act will still be the principal cause of 
conception no matter what subsequent interventions are employed? Some 
assert that the conjugal act is closely associated with a natural process. 
Caffarra does not see any relevance of the natural processes subsequent to 
the conjugal act because, from the ethical point of view, the conjugal act is 
completed. Yet these natural processes may have important ramifications 
for determining whether a technology assists the conjugal act. If these 
natural processes are interrupted by the technical intervention, does that 
disrupt the causal connection between intercourse and conception? If so, 
the one criterion he proposes, though true, may be insufficient by itself 
because more must be taken into account. 
24 
2. The Child Conceived as the Fruit of the Conjugal Act, and the 
Moral Unity between the Conjugal Act and the Reproductive 
Technology 
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Orville Griese believes that GIFT/TOTS could be morally licit. There 
is a true and proper conjugal act open to life. Because conception could 
occur by the sperm deposited in the vagina, the causal link between the 
conjugal act and conception is preserved, and so also the inseparable bond 
between the unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act is 
preserved. 
Since some theologians might insist that the TOT procedure could be 
morally acceptable only if there is some possibility of a causal 
relationship between the preliminary conjugal union and conception, it 
should suffice to point out that there is always the possibility that the 
husband ' s sperm deposited in the wife 's vagina during the preliminary 
act of conjugal union could account for the fertilization of the 
repositioned ova. Due to that undeniable possibility, the inseparable 
bond between the unitive and the creative dimension of that particular 
preliminary act of conjugal union remains intact with regard both to 
intent and fact. 11 
Finally there is a moral union between the conjugal act and the intervening 
technical procedure because of the short duration of time needed to perform 
the procedure after the conjugal act has been posited. 12 
Donald McCarthy argues for the possible liceity of GIFT/TOTS 
because there is a true and proper conjugal act and the child conceived 
would be the fruit of the conjugal act. 
The Vatican Instruction teaches that "procreation is deprived of 
its proper perfection when it is not desired as the fruit of the conjugal 
act, that is to say, of the specific act of the spouses' union" (II , B, 4a). 
In the case of TOTS, a true conjugal act takes place. The fertilization 
which occurs may result from the husband 's sperm which are deposited 
directly in the wife ' s vagina. It may more likely occur from the sperm 
that are inserted in the Fallopian tube. In either case, normal in vivo 
fertilization occurs as a result of a specific and proper procreative act of 
the spouses. 13 
In addition, he believes that GIFT/TOTS is probably licit because 
fertilization takes place within the body of the mother, in its natural 
location as opposed to in a laboratory with in vitro fertilization. 
Furthermore, the conjugal act is not replaced by the technical intervention, 
which merely repositions the gametes in a somewhat similar way as the use 
of a syringe to propel the sperm further up the woman ' s reproductive tract. 
It so aids the conjugal act in reaching its objectives because it forms a 
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moral unity with the conjugal act derived from the same end. Thus, the 
conjugal act remains the essential step leading to conception . 14 
Germain Grisez's primary criterion is that the child conceived must be 
the fruit of the conjugal act, that is, the conjugal act must be the real cause 
of the child ' s conception . The conjugal act is not the real cause of the 
child ' s conception if it is merely incidental to the procedure. Furthermore, 
a procedure does not assist the conjugal act if it does not share the same 
goal as the conjugal act. In other words, there must be a moral unity, which 
is derived from the end, between the conjugal act and the technical 
procedure. 15 
Grisez believes that the conjugal act is incidental to the procedure 
GIFT/TOTS, and for this reason, the causal link between the conjugal act 
and conception is sundered . Fertilization is not caused by the conjugal act 
because the sperm that are used in the procedure are not deposited in the 
vagina by the conjugal act. Instead, the sperm utilized to fertilize the ovum 
in GIFT/TOTS have been intentionally withheld from the marital act and 
collected in the silastic sheath . Furthermore the ovum to be utilized is 
removed from the woman prior to intercourse and then later introduced 
after intercourse. Since the ovum is absent during the marital act, its 
fertilization can hardly be considered the aim of the marital act. In sum, the 
child conceived would in no way be the fruit of the conjugal act, since the 
ovum and sperm that are used in no way pertain to the conjugal act. The 
sperm have been intentionally withheld from the act, and the ovum 
removed prior to the act. The man and woman would merely provide the 
material for the technical procedure from which conception is the fruit. 16 
If this were the sole criterion for the moral evaluation, one would reach a 
conclusion similar to Germain Grisez' s. 
26 
Assisting the marital act is not wrong in itself, so long as the 
couple engage in a genuine marital act that remains the real cause of the 
child ' s conception. Instead of the actual procedure used in TOTS, 
suppose that after the couple engaged in a normal act of intercourse, the 
semen were taken from the vagina and/or the ovum from the ovary, and 
one or both elements, perhaps after treatment of some pathological 
condition or conditions, were moved to the fallopian tube where they 
could meet. Provided the intention motivating such procedures were 
precisely to assist the marital act, these steps would do that. Somewhat 
similar technical maneuvers, however, could violate rather than assist 
the marital act, if they were intended, for example, merely as a scientific 
experiment or as a way to delay conception by freezing the elements so 
that the couple might choose to have a child later. 17 
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As long as there is a true and proper conjugal act and the sperm used in any 
subsequent intervention has been deposited in the vagina, the subsequent 
interventions are considered to assist the conjugal act. Such interventions 
share in the same goal or end as the conjugal act and would be said to assist 
in just that way. The continuity of the causal process is preserved insofar 
as the unity of the end is maintained. The conjugal act and the subsequent 
interventions all aim at the same goal , so the technical interventions are 
said to assist the conjugal act achieve that same goal. When the goal of the 
interventions is different from that of the conjugal act, for example when 
they are used for experimental purposes or to delay conception, the unity of 
the causal processes is broken . The interventions could no longer be said 
to assist the conjugal act because they no longer aim at the same goal as the 
conjugal act. 
These authors implicitly propose the following criteria for 
determining whether a reproductive technology assists or replaces the 
conjugal act. I) There must be a true and proper conjugal acl. 2) The 
child conceived must be the fruit of Ihe conjugal act. 3) In order for the 
child conceived to be the fruit of the conjugal aCI, the conjugal acl must not 
be merely incidental to the procedure. 4) Conception must lake place 
within the mother 's body. 5) There must be a moral unity between the 
conjugal act and a subsequent technical intervention. 
Once again, the first criterion is obvious. Any technical intervention 
cannot be said to assist the conjugal act if there is no conjugal act. 
With respect to the second criterion, McCarthy observed that Donum 
Vitae requires that the child conceived be the fruit of the conjugal act. 
However, McCarthy holds that in GIFT/TOTS the child could be the fruit 
of the conjugal act either from the sperm deposited in the vagina or from 
the sperm inserted into the fallopian tube, and Griese just presumes that 
this causal link between the conjugal act and conception is preserved if the 
spenn is deposited in the vagina and so could possibly fertilize the ovum. 
Though this is a true criterion enunciated by Donum Vitae, these authors do 
not adequately explain how it must be fulfilled, for they do not examine the 
possibility that a subsequent intervention might frustrate the causal 
influence of the conjugal act on fertilization . This topic will be taken up in 
greater detail later. 
The third criterion helps to discern whether the child is the fruit of the 
conjugal act. As Grisez observed, if the gametes used to obtain conception 
do not pertain to the conjugal act, then the conjugal act is merely incidental 
to the procedure, and the child cannot be the fruit of the conjugal act. 
The fourth criterion is also an important one. McCarthy posits this 
criterion by observing that the conjugal act aims at fertilization within the 
mother' s body. Fertilization outside the mother' s body is not the proper 
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goal of the conjugal act. 18 Furthermore, fertilization outside the mother's 
body subjects human generation to the liabilities of the laboratory.19 
Further discussion will present additional reasons for the truth of this 
. • JO 
crlterlon .-
The fifth criterion of moral unity is also necessary. Griese and Hess 
seem to consider moral unity with respect to the time within which the 
intervention occurs. It seems to be necessary to preserve moral unity that 
the subsequent intervention and resulting conception occur within a time 
period somewhat proximate to the conjugal act. Otherwise, for example, if 
the sperm and ovum were harvested and injected into the fallopian tube a 
year later, how could one say that the resulting conception would be the 
fruit of a conjugal act that had occurred a year earlier? However, Griese 
and Hess do not provide any reasons for the truth of moral unity based on 
time. Though it seems true, it must be true for some reason. McCarthy and 
Grisez consider the moral unity of the technical intervention in terms of a 
shared goal. To preserve moral unity, the technical intervention must have 
the same goal as the conjugal act, namely, fertilization within the mother's 
body. McCarthy believes GIFT/TOTS preserves that moral unity because 
the sperm and ovum are merely repositioned to achieve that goal, 
fertilization within the mother' s body. Grisez believes that a technical 
intervention would share the same goal as the conjugal act if the sperm 
were removed from the vagina after intercourse and later introduced. 
Obviously, if a technical means were employed for a purpose other than 
obtaining conception, for example for experimental purposes, it could not 
be said to assist the conjugal act achieve conception. Yet this criterion of 
moral unity derived from the end is insufficient in itself for it does not 
consider whether any subsequent intervention, even though it shares the 
same end as the conjugal act, may disrupt the causal link between the 
conjugal act and conception. More must be considered to determine 
whether conception is the fruit of the conjugal act. 
In sum, these five criteria are important to determine whether a 
reproductive technology assists or replaces the conjugal act. However, this 
presentation of the criteria is deficient in that it does not provide an 
adequate account of how to determine whether the child is the fruit of the 
conjugal act. 
3. Principal and Instrumental Causes, Active Condition, and the 
Immediate Causal Factors that are Natural 
Peter Cataldo presents a detailed account of how to determine 
whether the child is the fruit of the conjugal act. He says: 
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It is important to interpret the meaning of substitution or 
replacement in this context as referring not simply to (I) the elimination 
of the physical act of marital coitus, but also to (2) the usurpation of the 
proper causality of the conjugal act beyond coitus, even though that act 
may have been performed and the semen collected in a morally 
acceptable way. Since assistance to the conjugal act includes assistance 
to the generative process as the natural objective beyond the physical 
act of coitus, the meaning of substitution or replacement must also refer 
to that same process beyond coitus. I will presume both meanings of 
substitution and replacement throughout my analysis. Procedures that 
assist the conjugal act preserve the essential link between the conjugal 
act as the beginning and end points of a process. Those that replace the 
conjugal act sever the link.! ' 
In order to determine whether the link between the conjugal act and 
conception is preserved, Cataldo introduces the distinction between 
principal cause, instrumental cause, and active condition . The conjugal act 
remains the principal cause of conception provided that the reproductive 
technology serves as an instrumental cause or supplies the active 
conditions. 22 In this light, Cataldo offers the following definition of 
assistance and replacement and the criterion to distinguish assistance from 
replacement. 
Extrapolating from Donllm Vitae and considering the causal 
concepts examined above, the following definitions for replacement and 
assistance may be given: A procedure replaces the conjugal act if 
either coitus is not perjormed. or the conjugal act is not the principal 
(per se) cause oj j ertili::ation itself A procedure assists the conjugal 
act if it supplies the instrumental causes and active conditions(s) jor 
the conjugal act to junction as the principal (per se) cause oj 
j ertilization itself A criterion for morally evaluating specific 
procedures consistent with the definitions would be: A procedure 
replaces the conjugal act if it determines, of itself, and immediately, the 
success of fertilization. A procedure assists the conjugal act if it does 
not determine, oj itself and immediately. the success oj jertilization, 
but rather allows jertilization to take place under immediate causal 
(actors that are natural. This criterion covers both types of assistance 
. in the teaching, viz., assistance to the performance of the conjugal act 
itself and to the attainment of its objective.23 
There are two major strengths and two major weaknesses to Cataldo ' s 
proposed definition of assistance and replacement and his proposed 
criterion to distinguish assistance from replacement. These strengths and 
weaknesses will now be considered . 
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a. Strengths of Cataldo's Definition and Criterion 
i. The Conjugal Act Must Be the Principal Cause of Fertilization 
In order to distinguish assistance from replacement, Cataldo notes that 
it is necessary to employ the concept of causality from metaphysics.24 A 
principal cause is per se responsible for the effect, and so Cataldo, in 
referring to Donum Vitae, shows how the conjugal act is to be the principal 
cause of ferti I ization: 
The conjugal act is described in terms of per se causali ty in Donum 
Vitae where it states that the conj ugal act is ''' per se suitable for the 
generation of children to which marriage is ordered by its nature and by 
which the spouses become one fl esh. ", The conjugal act of the spouses 
is aptly suited as a principal cause since both spouses act together as 
principal agents in an action ordered to the effect of the ex istence of a 
new human life which, as such , is an effect that has an essential likeness 
to the human nature of the parents. Thus the spouses, in and through 
their conjugal act, are the conjoined principal causes of the child. This 
is what is meant by the description of the conjugal act as the principal 
cause of fertilization .25 
This observation will be critically important in distinguishing assistance 
from replacement. If some cause other than the conjugal act, namely a 
technical means, is the principal cause of fertilization , then the conjugal act 
is replaced. If the conjugal act remains the principal cause of fertilization, 
and the technical means is the assisting cause of fertilization , then the 
conjugal act is assisted. The question then, will be to distinguish what is 
the principal cause and what is the assisting cause of fertilization . 
ii. Supplying an Active Condition(s) as a Type of Assistance 
Cataldo describes an active condition as something that removes 
obstacles that prevent a cause from being effective. An active condition 
makes " it possible for a cause to exercise its activity. In general we may 
define a condition as a circumstance or set of circumstances that makes it 
possible for something to operate as a cause. ,,26 An active condition 
simply removes obstacles that frustrate the causality of the conjugal act. 
Thus, one can conclude that " [p ]rocedures that assist the conjugal act can 
also be said to supply the active condition(s) for the act to function as the 
principal cause offertilization."n 
The truth of this conclusion, which Cataldo also incorporates in his 
definition of assistance, can be easily seen . An active condition as such 
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does not exert a positive causal influence on the final effect. It just 
provides the circumstances in which the principal cause can bring about the 
effect. In this regard, Robert Kreyche astutely observes that 
every real cause (in whatever order of causality) exercises a 
positive influence. Similarly. every effect is said to depend really and 
positively on the cause or causes that contribute to it. At this point, 
however, we must consider the distinction between a cause in the 
proper sense of the term and something characterized as a condition. 
A condition should not be called a "cause," because the 
" influence" of a condition is chiefly negative . .. . [T]he influence of the 
condition is negative in that it consists in the removal of obstacles 
without which the effect could not take place. Hence, the role of a 
condition as such is to make it possible for a cause to exercise its 
activity.28 
Because an active condition does not exert any positive causal influence as 
such on the effect, it cannot be considered the principal cause of the effect. 
It does not, then, usurp the primacy of the principal cause. Rather, it 
remains subordinate to and so assists the principal cause in bringing about 
the effect. 
Cataldo adds an important point that must be considered to determine 
whether, in fact, a reproductive technology provides an active condition . 
Any criterion that applies the teaching to procedures would need 
to distinguish those that provide active conditions from those that do 
not. In other words, there is a difference between procedures that 
provide active conditions, which remove a hindrance specific to the 
natural causality of the conjugal act, and procedures that remove a 
hindrance only accidentally, as a result o f creating a whole new line of 
causality for fertilization. 29 
To make such a distinction, Cataldo notes that fertilization must occur 
under the immediate causal factors that are natural , for he notes that 
"Dol1um Vitae focuses on those specific causes and conditions that bring 
about the act of fertilization itself," and that the Instruction requires that 
conception takes place within the mother ' s body.3o In this way, Cataldo 
believes that one would be dealing with a procedure that truly, and not 
accidentally, removes a hindrance, because it would allow fertilization to 
occur in its natural place, allowing the conjugal act to exercise its principal 
causality. For this reason he believes that GIFT provides the active 
conditions for the conjugal act to be effective. It allows conception to take 
place under the immediate causal factors that are natural. The immediate 
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causal factors under which fertilization occurs are not determined or 
created by the procedure." For this same reason he believes that in vitro 
fertilization only accidentally removes a hindrance and does not, therefore, 
supply the active conditions for the conjugal act to exercise its principal 
causality. It introduces its own line of causality because the procedure 
itself supplies the immediate causal factors that bring about fertilization. 
Thus, the procedure, and not the conjugal act, causes fertilization .32 
In sum, Cataldo makes an important contribution in the attempt to 
distinguish assistance from replacement. A procedure assists if it supplies 
an active condition(s) for the conjugal act to exercise its own principal 
causality. If fertilization occurs outside the mother' s body, the technical 
means does not truly supply an active condition(s), rather it introduces a 
whole new line of causality that replaces the conjugal act. 
b. Weaknesses of Cataldo's Definition and Criterion 
i. The Introduction of the Term "Instrumental Cause" 
As noted above, Cataldo defines a procedure that assists the conjugal 
act in this way: 
A procedure assists the conjugal act if it supplies the instrumental 
causes and active condition(s) jor the conjugal act to junction as the 
principal (per se) cause ojjertilization itself )} 
If he said "supplies the assisting causes'- instead of " instrumental causes", I 
would not object. However, . the use of " instrumental cause" in his 
definition brings difficulties to the attempt to distinguish assistance from 
replacement. I will now proceed in three steps in order to illustrate these 
difficulties: a) Cataldo ' s definitions of principal and instrumental causes 
along with the conclusion he reaches; b) the first difficulty in the term 
" instrumental cause"; c) finally, the second difficulty in the term 
" instrumental cause" . 
a) Principal and Instrumental Causes 
The principal cause is per se responsible for the effect and acts on its 
own power.34 "The conjugal act is described in terms of per se causality in 
Donum Vitae where it states that the conjugal act is ' per se suitable for the 
generation of children to which marriage is ordered by its nature and by 
which the spouses become one flesh. ' ,,35 The principal cause is primarily 
responsible for the effect; whereas, the instrumental cause plays a 
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subordinate role in bringing about the effect. Cataldo defines an 
instrumental cause as "something other than, and extrinsic to, the principal 
cause or agent, which uses the instrument to bring about an effect.,,36 The 
instrument is really a cause s ince it is in some way responsible for the 
effect. For example, the types of brushes that the artist uses will determine 
the texture and definition of the painting, yet the artist as such remains the 
cause of the painting. He is primarily responsible for the painting and the 
brushes have a subordinate role. Cata ldo then distinguishes two types of 
instrumental causes: (A) one that acts s imply in a one-to-one relationship, 
as a writer (the principal cause) uses a pen (the instrumental cause) to write 
(the effect); and (8) " the instrumenta l use or application of something that 
acts with its own principal causality, e.g., the transfusion of blood to 
produce health.,,37 This di st inction between the two types of instrumental 
causes will be taken up later in greater deta il. 
Then, after examining principal and instrumental causality, Cataldo 
concludes: 
Reproductive technologies that provide genuine assistance are 
those that constitute the instrumental causes to the principal cause, the 
conjugal act. The instrumentali ty of these procedures is a combination 
of the two types of instrumental causes. The natural , principal causality 
of the conjugal act is used and applied for its own fulfillment (8 above) 
by means of other various instrumental causes (A above) .38 
The two difficulties can now be seen by taking up the two parts of this 
conclusion. 
b) The First Difficulty 
The first way in which the te rm " instrumental cause" muddies the 
waters arises because Cataldo overlooks that there are two manners in 
which an instrumental cause can be an ass isting cause . In the first manner 
(I), an instrumental cause is necessarily an assisting cause with respect to 
the agent or cause that applies it. An instrumental cause must be applied 
by a principal cause to which it is subordinate, or which it assists . Cataldo 
himself indicated thi s in his definition of an instrumental cause: 
" something other than, and extrinsic to, the principal cause or agent, which 
uses the instrument to bring about an e.!fect. ,,"9 In this way, an instrume~tal 
cause is necessarily an assisting cause insofar as it assists the principal 
cause that applies it. For example, when an author uses a pen to write a 
letter, the pen, the instrumental cause, is necessarily an assisting cause with 
respect to the author who uses the pen. In the second manner (2), an 
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instrumental cause mayor may nor be an assisting cause with respect to an 
agent or cause other than the one {hell applies it. For example, a person 
dictates a letter to a scribe who uses a pen to write it. The pen is an 
instrument applied by the scribe. Even though the pen is not applied by the 
person dictating the letter, one can still see that the pen assists the person 
dictating to write the letter. Yet on the other hand, for example, a beaver 
begins to gnaw on a tree to bring it down. After he takes only a few bites, a 
man comes by, scares the beaver away and chops down the tree with an 
axe. The axe is an instrument applied by the man . The beaver is a cause 
other than the one that appl ied the instrument. Here the axe does not assist 
the beaver. The axe assists the man who remains the principal cause of 
felling the tree, for he provided by far most of the effort. If anything, the 
beaver is another assisting cause. He assisted the man in felling the tree, 
insofar as he took out a small chunk of the tree with his teeth. 
In the first part of his conclusion, Cataldo considers the reproductive 
technologies with respect to the conjugal act: " Reproductive technologies 
that assist are those that are instrumental causes to the principal cause, the 
conjugal act.,,40 However, the conjugal act is not the agent that applies the 
technologies; the medical personnel apply the technologies. Therefore, the 
technologies are the instruments of the medical personnel , or perhaps also 
the spouses, but they are not instruments of the conjugal act. 
This is where the confusion arises . Instrumental causes (in this case 
the reproductive technologies) are necessarily assisting causes with respect 
to the agent or cause that applies them. The medical personnel, or perhaps 
also the spouses, are the agents or causes that apply them. Therefore, the 
reproductive technologies are necessarily ass isting causes with respect to 
the medical personnel, or perhaps the spouses. Instrumental causes (in this 
case the reproductive technologies) may or may not be assisting causes 
with respect to an agent or cause other than the one that applies them. The 
conjugal act is a cause other than the one that applies them. Therefore, the 
reproductive technologies may or may 110{ be assi sting causes with respect 
to the conjugal act. 
Thus, defining assistance to the conjugal act in terms of " instrumental 
causes" brings confusion to the attempt to distinguish assistance from 
replacement. Since the reproductive technologies are not applied by the 
conjugal act, insofar as they are instrumental causes, they mayor may not 
assist the conjugal act in achieving conception. Now the use of a technical 
means may still assist the conjugal act, but one cannot determine that it 
assists insofar as it is an instrumental cause, for it is not an instrument 
applied by the conjugal act as the principal agent, but by the medical 
personnel or perhaps even the spouses. Thus, one might say that a 
technical means is an instrumental cause that assists the medical personnel 
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who apply it, but then it still needs to be determined whether the medical 
personnel are assisting the conjugal act by applying this technical means. 
c) The Second Difficulty 
There is a second way in which the term "instrumental cause" 
muddies the water. There are two types of instrumental causes. Cataldo 
considers the second type of instrumental cause to be a principal cause. 
This is where the problem lies, for, properly speaking, an instrumental 
cause is an assisting cause, not a principal cause. As already noted above, 
Cataldo describes the two types of instrumental causes this way: (A) one 
that acts simply in a one-to-one relationship, as a writer (the principal 
cause) uses a pen (the instrumental cause) to write (the effect); and (8) " the 
instrumental use or application of something that acts with its own 
principal causality, e.g., the transfusion of blood to produce health .,,4 1 He 
then incorporates this notion of the two types of instrumental causes in his 
conclusion: 
The instrumentality of these procedures is a combination of the two 
types of instrumental causes. The natural , principal causality of the 
conjugal act is used and applied for its own fulfillment (8 above) by 
means of other various instrumental causes (A above).42 
In this conclusion he seems to think that the natural causality of the 
conjugal act is an instrumental cause of the second type (8) that in tum is 
applied by the technical procedures, which are instrumental causes of the 
first type (A). There is some problem in analyzing Cataldo's position here, 
because he does not say how the natural causality of the conjugal act is the 
second type of instrumental cause. He does not say how it is applied by the 
other instrumental causes. He simply asserts this . 
One can only surmise what may have led him to assert that the natural 
causality of the conjugal act is an instrumental cause of the second type (8) 
that in tum is applied by the technical procedures, which are instrumental 
causes of the first type (A). If one looks at the procedure GIFT/TOTS, one 
might be able to uncover hi s thought. Perhaps Cataldo considers the 
introduction of the sperm and ovum into the fallopian tube in this 
procedure as something analogous to a blood transfusion, since the sperm 
and ovum act with their own proper causality within the mother' s body, 
just like blood acts with its own proper causality in a blood transfusion . 
Even though it is not clear how Cataldo reaches his conclusion, he will be 
given the benefit of the doubt. 
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Regardless of how Cataldo concluded that the natural causality of the 
conjugal act is an instrumental cause of the second type (B) applied in tum 
by the technical procedures which are instrumental causes of the first type 
(A), one might look at Cataldo' s position in this way. Since the second 
type of instrumental cause is a principal cause, it remains a principal cause 
even though it is applied by another agent or cause. Since the natural 
causality of the conjugal act is the second type of instrumental cause, it 
remains a principal cause even though it is applied by some other agent or 
cause. Because Cataldo considers the second type of instrumental cause to 
be a principal cause, he can maintain that the natural causality of the 
conjugal act remains the principal cause of conception even though it is 
applied by the technical procedure. 
Yet as already noted, there is a problem here insofar as Cataldo 
considers the second type of instrumental cause to be a principal cause. 
Properly speaking, all instrumental causes are not principal causes; they are 
assisting causes. Thus, if the natural causality of the conjugal act is the 
second type of instrumental cause (B), it cannot be the principal cause of 
conception. Instead of describing the second type of instrumental cause the 
way Cataldo does as "the instrumental use of something that acts with its 
own principal causality," it is better to describe it as "the instrumental use 
of something that acts with its own proper causality." 
To see better Cataldo' s misunderstanding, let us now take a closer 
look at this second type of instrumental cause. Another author, Martin 
Vaske, SJ, describes the second type of instrumental cause this way: 
Natural forces may be used instrumentally to bring about an 
effect intended by the principal cause. A lumberjack, for example, 
instead of grubbing up the stump of a tree by the direct use of simple 
instruments, such as an axe and a shovel , may use the natural power of 
dynamite to blow the stump sky-high. In such cases, the powerful 
activity of a natural agent is directed along an intended line by the 
principal cause.43 
This second type of instrumental cause (B) may also be seen in the work of 
the brew master who pitches yeast into the wort to make beer. The 
brewmaster is the principal cause of the beer, but he makes use of the 
natural activity of the yeast to do so. In these examples, the lumberjack and 
the brewmaster are primarily responsible for the effects; they are the 
principal causes. The dynamite and the yeast playa subordinate role in 
bringing about the effects. They are the instrumental causes that are 
applied under the direction of the principal causes. Thus, it is best to 
describe the second type of instrumental cause as "the instrumental use of 
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something that acts with its own proper causality." In this light, one can 
see that if the natural causality of the conjugal act is an instrumental cause 
that is applied by the technical procedures, then the natural causality of the 
conjugal act is the assisting cause and the technical procedure the principal 
cause of conception . 
In sum, there are two major difficulties in defining assistance to the 
conj ugal act in terms of instrumental causes. First, instrumental causes are 
necessarily assisting causes with respect to the agent or cause that applies 
them. Instrumental causes may or may not be assisting causes with respect 
to an agent or cause other than the agent or cause that applies them. Since 
the conjugal act is a cause other than the agent or cause that the applies the 
reproductive technologies, the reproductive technologies, as instrumental 
causes, may or may not be assisting causes with respect to the conjugal act. 
Second, all instrumental causes are assisting causes subordinate to the 
principal causes that apply them. If, in fact, the natural causality of the 
conjugal act is an instrumental cause, then it is an assisting cause 
subordinate to the technology that applies it. Thus, the technology would 
be the principal cause, and the conjugal act the assisting cause of 
conception . Perhaps Cataldo ' s difficulty stems from overlooking that an 
instrumental cause is not the only type of assisting cause. 
ii. Drawing the Line at the Immediate Causal Factors 
That Bring About Fertilization 
Cataldo misunderstands the causal continuity between the conjugal 
act and conception. To distinguish assistance from replacement, he draws 
the line at the immediate causal factors that bring about fertilization. This, 
perhaps, is the greatest weakness of his position . He states: 
The reproductive technologies analyzed here affect the objective 
of the conjugal act. For this reason it is critical to note that the criterion 
proposed below for morally evaluating procedures centers on the way in 
which fertilization takes place in the procedures. The act offertilization 
is pivotal in Donum Vitae for detennining whether a procedure has 
replaced the conjugal act. With respect to assistance for what is called 
the "natural purpose," "proper end," or "natural objectives" of the 
conjugal act, Donum Vitae focuses on those specific causes and 
conditions that bring about the act of fertilization itself. Accordingly, 
the criterion has been fonnulated on that basis. This is also why 
Donum Vitae explicitly emphasizes the fact that in IVF fertilization 
occurs outside the body ... . 
If and when fertilization is successful in IVF, it is so precisely 
because of active conditions that are outside and independent of the 
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body. Thus, in the language of Donum Vitae, fertilization has been 
detennined by technical action. Given the pivotal role of fertilization in 
Donum Vitae for making ethical evaluation, any criterion for 
distinguishing between procedures that assist and procedures that 
replace must draw the line at the immediate causal factors within the 
procedures - both causes and active conditions - that bring about 
fertilization itself. Whether these factors are due to the procedure is not 
the question. By contrast, if the line were not drawn at fertilization, 
then the distinction between assistance and replacement would collapse. 
By not beginning a moral evaluation with the factors of fertilization 
itself, any third party action . .. interposing itself at any point between 
the conjugal act and fertilization could arguably be considered as 
replacing the causal action of the conjugal act. 44 
Cataldo then provides his criterion to determine whether a procedure 
assists or replaces the conjugal act. 
A procedure replaces the conjugal act if it determines, of itself, 
and immediately, the success of fertilization. A procedure assists the 
conjugal act if it does not determine, of itself, and immediately the 
success of f ertilization, but rather allows fertilization to take place 
under the immediate causal factors that are natural. 45 
If one considers this criterion more closely, one notes that it is true, 
but not sufficient. The immediate causal factors that are natural can only 
be found within the mother's body. Clearly, if fertilization occurs outside 
the mother's body, for example, in a procedure such as in vitro fertilization 
in which the gametes meet because they are placed in a culture medium in a 
petri dish, these immediate causal factors introduce a whole new line of 
causality, and the causal link between the conjugal act and conception is 
sundered. The conjugal act could no longer be considered the principal 
cause of conception .46 The immediate causal factors in this technical 
intervention, as well as any technical intervention that occurs outside the 
mother' s body, determine of themselves and immediately the success of 
fertilization. Therefore, fertilization can only occur within the mother ' s 
body, as Donum Vitae so observes.47 Furthermore, provided that there is a 
true act of intercourse, the gametes are obtained in a morally licit way, and 
fertilization occurs within the mother' s body, that is, under the immediate 
causal factors that are natural , any technical means employed would be said 
to assist the conjugal act. Yet the insufficiency of this criterion can be seen 
in light of an example provided by Nicholas Tonti-Filippini. 
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Consider the situation in which sperm has been obtained from the 
vagina subsequent to a "true and proper conjugal act", but is frozen 
awaiting its use in a GIFT procedure. Ova are obtained and these too 
are frozen and stored in order to await the recovery of the uterus from 
the effects of the superovulants or some other illness. Eventually, say 
five months later, the ova and sperm are thawed and transferred 
separately to the fallopian tubes where a new life originates.48 
In this case, conception would occur under the immediate causal factors 
that are natural , and so would meet Cataldo' s requirement for assistance. 
However, could a conception really be caused by a conjugal act that took 
place five months earlier? In some way Cataldo ' s criterion is insufficient. 
If one adds to Cataldo' s criterion the one of moral unity based upon 
time which was discussed above, the difficulty proposed by Tonti-
Filippini ' s example could be avoided, for such a procedure would not meet 
the criterion of moral unity based upon time. In fact, in another work, 
Cataldo proposes such a criterion. He holds that the sperm must be used 
within seventy-two hours of its collection because that is the period of its 
natural viability for fertilization .49 However, in the discussion of this 
criterion as proposed by Griese and Hess, no cogent reasons are given why 
it must be met. It is simply asserted . Yet Cataldo supplies a reason: 
seventy-two hours is the period of natural viability of the sperm for 
fertilization . However, must the sperm be used within seventy-two hours 
just because this is the natural period of viability? Why could not freezing 
the sperm to use it later be considered an assistance insofar as it extends the 
period of viability? There must be some reason why such a delay frustrates 
the principal causality of the conjugal act. 
Cataldo observes that the conjugal act initiates a whole process or 
series of secondary causes that lead to conception, and that assistance and 
replacement must also refer to this generative process beyond the conjugal 
act. 50 Subsequent discussion wi II show that if the continuity of this natural 
causal chain is broken, the principal causality of the conjugal act is 
replaced. Yet Cataldo does object to such a criterion,5 ) and his objections 
and answers to them will be taken up in the course of discussion. Attention 
now turns, then, to the discussion of the natural processes, which are 
subsequent to the conjugal act and lead to conception, and the necessity of 
the continuity of this causal chain to preserve the principal causality of the 
conjugal act. 
4. The Fruit of the Conjugal Act and the Continuity of the Causal 
Process from the Conjugal Act to Conception 
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a. Inadequate Accounts of the Necessary Continuity of the Causal 
Process 
Some authors believe that the multiple technical interventions in 
GIFT/TOTS break the continuity between the conjugal act and 
conception.52 It seems that implicit in this objection to GIFT/TOTS might 
be the inviolability of the natural processes that are initiated with the 
conjugal act and lead to conception . For example, DeMarco provides a 
distinction between assisted and artificial insemination based upon natural 
processes. 
In "assisted" fonns of insemination. the spenn retains its own 
capacity for movement and travels through its naturally appointed 
course. Insemination is artificial when the spenn is entirely passive 
with regard to its manner of relocation, and travels through a route that 
nature did not provide.53 
The multiple technical interventions in GIFT/TOTS violate the continuity 
between the conjugal act and conception that these natural processes 
provide. Yet it is still not clear why this continuity provided by the natural 
processes is so necessary to preserve the principal causality of the conjugal 
act. There are several questions to be answered . What does it mean to 
interrupt this continuity provided by the natural processes subsequent to the 
conjugal act? Does any subsequent intervention or modification of these 
processes constitute an interruption of the continuity? If this continuity is 
interrupted, why must one then conclude that the technical intervention 
replaces the conjugal act? If this continuity is interrupted, why must one 
conclude that the technical means is then the principal cause of conception? 
Why cannot these technical interruptions be considered acts of assistance? 
It cannot be that the number of technical interventions, or simply that there 
are interventions, are the reasons why the causal continuity between the 
conjugal act and conception is disrupted .5~ 
Nicholas Tonti-Filippini astutely observes that Donum Vitae not only 
requires that there must be a true and proper conjugal act, but also that the 
child conceived must be the fruit of the conjugal act. His criteria then are 
two: 1) There must be a true and proper conjugal act. 2) The conjugal act 
must have a direct causal relationship 10 the origin of new life. Tonti-
Filippini also provides a way to determine whether the conjugal act has 
such a direct causal relationship to the origin of new life. 
40 
In order to preserve the inseparable connection between the 
unitive and procreative meanings, aspects or dimensions of the conjugal 
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act, the direct causal connection between the conjugal act and the origin 
of a human life must be uninterrupted by any other human act. .. . 
In general, those forms of assistance within the context of a 
marriage which do not displace the conjugal act and do not interrupt the 
direct causal process between the conjugal act and the origin of new life 
seem to be acceptable. 55 
He sees here that the conjugal act initiates a causal process, that is, the 
natural processes subsequent to the conjugal act that lead to conception. A 
technical intervention that interrupts this natural causal process replaces the 
conjugal act since the direct causal relationship of the conjugal act to 
conception has been sundered . Thus, the technical means would be the 
direct cause of conception and the conjugal act only the indirect cause of 
conception. In this way, the technical means replaces the conjugal act. For 
this very reason Tonti-Filippini gives a negative moral evaluation of 
GIFT/TOTS.56 
Why must this causal process initiated by the conjugal act remain 
intact? To support such an opinion Tonti-Filippini provides an analogy 
with golf. If a caddy were to push the golfer' s ball closer to the hole after it 
had stopped, his intervention would not be a; assistance to the golfer' s 
drive, but an act distinct from the drive. These are two distinct acts even 
though they have the same goal , to move the ball toward the hole. In 
GIFT/TOTS there are two such distinct acts. The conjugal act is indirectly 
the cause of conception insofar as it supplies the sperm. However, the 
technical intervention is the direct cause of conception because fertilization 
follows as a consequence of that intervention.57 
Tonti-Filippini does well to speak of assistance and replacement in 
terms of causality insofar as the child conceived must be the fruit of the 
conjugal act. However, it is not helpful to distinguish assistance from 
replacement in terms of direct and indirect causes. From his account, it 
seems that the last intervening cause is the principal cause. Is that always 
true? Peter Cataldo, for example, observes that in nature the conjugal act is 
never the direct cause of conception. In the natural processes, which are 
subsequent to the conjugal act and which lead to conception, there is a 
whole structure of secondary causes leading to conception. Thus, one 
cannot conclude, as Tonti-Filippini does, that the conjugal act is not the 
principal cause of conception because it is not the direct cause of 
conception.58 Tonti-Filippini has misunderstood the way the conjugal act 
causes conception through the subsequent natural processes. It does not 
cause conception directly but mediately. Therefore, if the principal 
causal ity of the conjugal act is to be preserved, the continuity of the natural 
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causal chain must require something other than that the conjugal act be the 
direct cause of conception. 
In commenting on Donum Vitae, Agneta Sutton makes an important 
contribution to detennine what it means to assist the conjugal act. She lists 
two ways in which a technology may assist the conjugal act: I) assist the 
perfonnance of the conjugal act; 2) complete a process initiated by the 
conjugal act or allow the sexual act to be causally effective in achieving 
conception. 
Donum Vitae makes a distinction between, on the one hand, 
interventions which bypass sexual intercourse and amount to a 
substitute for it and, on the other, interventions which facilitate the 
performance of the sexual act, complete a process initiated by the 
sexual act or allow the sexual act to be causally effective in achieving 
conception. 59 
Sutton then provides a moral evaluation of reproductive technologies 
based upon the manner in which a technical intervention may be said to 
assist. Though Sutton provides no example, she deems that an intervention 
that helps a couple perfonn the conjugal act is morally licit.60 This satisfies 
her first criterion. One can also note that the natural processes that follow 
intercourse remain undisturbed . In addition, the conjugal act would be 
causally effective in achieving conception, since there would be no other 
way by which the gametes could come in contact with each other. There 
are no other interventions. In this way her second criterion is also satisfied. 
Using these same criteria, Sutton judges another procedure to be 
morally pennissible. After intercourse, a couple may utilize a medical 
intervention to transport the spenn deposited in the vagina further up the 
wife's reproductive tract. Such an intervention may not remove the spenn 
from the wife's body in order to reintroduce it later. Rather it involves the 
use of an instrument to assist the passage of the spenn from the vagina 
through the cervix to the uterus, and so enable it to reach the site of 
fertilization.61 Sutton believes this meets the second criterion. With this 
intervention, the conjugal act " is an essential part of the sequence leading 
to conception. It, and not a medical intervention, initiates this sequence.,,62 
In this way the intervention is said to complete a process initiated by the 
conjugal act and so also allows the conjugal act to be causally effective in 
achieving conception. 
Sutton again uses these same criteria to evaluate GIFT/TOTS, which 
she considers to be illicit. Since GIFT/TOTS removes the spenn from the 
woman's vagina and later deposits it along with an ovum in a fallopian 
tube, it initiates anew the process that leads to conception. It does not, 
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then, complete a process initiated by the conjugal act. Thus, the child 
conceived would be the fruit of the technical intervention and not the 
conjugal act.63 This violates the second criterion. 
Note that in this discussion Sutton has overcome the weaknesses of 
Tonti-Filippini's presentation. For her, it is not necessary that the conjugal 
act be the direct cause of conception in order to preserVe its principal 
causality. Yet, she recognizes the importance of the natural processes, 
which are subsequent to the conjugal act, and which lead to conception. In 
order to preserve the principal causality of the conjugal act, the conjugal 
act must initiate this causal process, and a technical intervention may then 
complete this causal process, but it may not initiate it anew. 
Based upon Sutton's discussion, the following criteria to judge 
whether a technology assists or replaces the conjugal act may be proposed. 
1) A technical intervention that enables the performance of the conjugal 
act can be said to assist the conjugal act. 2) A technical intervention may 
complete the natural processes initiated by the conjugal act or may allow 
the conjugal act to become causally effective in achieving conception. Any 
intervention that initiates these natural processes anew replaces the 
conjugal act, for then the technical means is causally effective in achieving 
conception and not the conjugal act. 
There are weaknesses, though in Sutton's account. She does not 
demonstrate how she arrives at these criteria. It is not clear why a technical 
intervention may not initiate the natural processes anew. Implicit in her 
criteria is the notion that if the technical means initiates the processes that 
lead to conception instead of completing them, it then is the principal cause 
in bringing about conception, not the conjugal act. Yet, unfortunately, 
Sutton does not demonstrate why that is so . More analysis is still needed. 
b. A Necessary Continuity of the Causal Process 
In a splendid, thorough treatment on the distinction between 
assistance and replacement, Josef Seifert reaches the following conclusion 
on the requirements for a reproductive technology if it is to assist the 
conjugal act: 
In the light of these distinctions we may now say that an activity, 
in order to qualify as assistance to the conjugal act, rather than 
substituting it, must fulfill the conditions - inasmuch as they concern 
the relation between the sexual intercourse and conception - which are 
required quite generally for the continuity of a causal process and which 
also apply to the causal link between the conjugal act and conception. 
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Moreover, the unity and continuity of the process requires the 
preservation of the personal act's meaningful bond to conception. It 
must not be the case that another personal act lacking the inner unity 
and meaningful rapport to conception, becomes the principal cause of 
conception.64 
To understand Seifert' s conclusion one must first note that intercourse 
is the cause of conception through the natural processes that are subsequent 
to and initiated by the marital embrace. In general , "a certain effect 
proceeds from the act [a human act] as from its cause in such a way that we 
can speak of a continuity of the process which leads from the cause to the 
effect. ,,65 In particular, intercourse initiates a causal chain of events that 
leads to conception. The conjugal act and the subsequent natural causal 
processes are intimately linked in bringing about conception. Conception 
would not occur without either. In the marital embrace, the spouses initiate 
a whole series of events that may continue for days before conception may 
result. Conception may result from their marital embrace insofar as they 
are bringing about the conditions in which a new human life can come to 
be, provided that they do not do anything to prevent conception. Previous 
discussion has questioned why the natural processes, which are subsequent 
to the conjugal act, are relevant for determining whether a technical 
intervention assists or replaces the conjugal act. Such processes are indeed 
relevant because the conjugal act causes conception through these natural 
processes. As Cataldo observed: "The unity of the sex act necessarily 
represents an intrinsic structure of secondary causes intervening between 
the conjugal act and its effect, fertilization .,,66 
For the conjugal act to exercise its causality in bringing about 
conception, it must do so by initiating a natural causal process, or a causal 
chain of events. Thus, one must examine how causes that initiate a causal 
chain of events are said to be the principal causes of the last effect in this 
causal chain. It will be shown that for an initiating cause to be the principal 
cause of the final effect, there must be a continuity of the causal process. 
Seifert describes four marks of the continuity of such a process. If any of 
these aspects of continuity are disrupted, the cause that initiates the process 
cannot be said to be the principal cause of the final effect of the process. 
Thus, if the continuity of the causal chain that is initiated by the conjugal 
act is disrupted, the conjugal act can no longer be said to be the principal 
cause of conception. 
Finally, there must be a meaningful bond between conception and the 
human action that brings it about. Seifert observes that only the conjugal 
act is a worthy cause of conception. 67 Though he does not develop this 
much, a discussion of the "language of the body," helps to illustrate why 
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only the conjugal act is such a worthy cause.68 Only the conjugal act can 
disclose the child's truth as a person, as a gift to be fulfilled by self-giving 
in love. Only the conjugal act can disclose the child's truth as an image of 
God insofar as he is a person who is to fulfill himself by entering into a 
communion of persons, ultimately by sharing in the communion of the 
Divine Persons. "Thus assistance to the conjugal act can be defined as an 
activity which respects the meaningful and non-substitutable bond between 
the personal conjugal act and procreation as its effect. ,,69 This meaningful 
bond is broken when the continuity of the causal process, which is initiated 
with the conjugal act, is disrupted. 
i. Temporal Continuity 
The first type of continuity of the causal chain is temporal. Temporal 
continuity between the cause and effect can be either simultaneous or over 
a span of time in which the consequences of the original cause continue to 
occur. To preserve temporal continuity, "there must never be a complete 
temporal hiatus between the initiation of the causal chain through the 
principal cause and the last effect produced by it. ,,70 In simultaneous 
continuity the effect occurs at the very same time the human person is 
acting and causing the effect. When someone carries a bag of groceries 
from the market, the groceries are carried at the same time the person is 
carrying them, and the groceries cease being carried when he puts them 
down on the kitchen counter.71 
What is more pertinent here, though, is the temporal causality over a 
span of time in which the consequences of the initial causal act continue to 
be operative. Seifert refers to an example from sport to illustrate this type 
of continuity in the causal chain. 
If a soccer player hits a ball which continues to move, in virtue of the 
player having shot it, and if it never stops completely from moving in 
consequence of the original shot, then we are confronted with one 
minimal condition for the continuity of the causal process that proceeds 
from the original player and his action. If the ball comes to a complete 
standstill, during which it does not move in any way under the influence 
of the original cause, we can no longer say that a further pushing of the 
ball by another player is an assistance to the original chain of causality. 
The complete temporal hiatus, during which the ball rests, contradicts 
the continuity of the causal chain. It requires an entirely new cause to 
move the ball from where it came to a standstill; and this new cause can 
no longer be interpreted as a mere assistance to the original causal 
chain. 
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Of course, it is still possible that the two causal chains interact so 
that we can say that one player assists the other to get a goal shot. In 
fact the whole team should and does in that larger sense assist each 
other. Nevertheless, it would not be right to say that a player that 
places the ball near the goal where it came to a complete standstill shot 
a goal if another player moves it after it has come to a complete 
standstill and shoots the goal. We cannot say that here the second 
player assisted the first one 's shooting a goal, albeit all will admit that 
the activity of the first player decisively contributed to, and in that sense 
assisted, the activity of the second player rendering it possible. 72 
The causal activity of the conjugal act with respect to conception involves 
this type of temporal continuity over a span of time. When a couple engage 
in the marital embrace, conception does not come about at the same time as 
the embrace. Rather, a series of natural processes are initiated that can 
continue for days before conception may occur. The conjugal act and the 
subsequent natural causal processes are intimately linked in bringing about 
conception. Conception would not occur without either. 
It also must be noted that the temporal continuity of a causal chain 
does not mean that all motion cannot cease. There can be various 
programmed starts and stops. Yet if there are such programmed starts and 
stops, the influence of the initial cause must still be operative through all 
these starts and stops for the temporal continuity to be preserved. There 
must never be a time when the influence of the initial cause ceases to be 
operative. Otherwise, the temporal continuity is broken.73 
Not all causal activity initiated by the human person requires temporal 
continuity. For example, one may make a conditional contract, the effects 
of which may not be operative until several years after the contract has 
been established.74 Yet the causal activity of the conjugal act requires 
temporal continuity to preserve its principal causality in bringing about 
conception. As seen, temporal continuity over a span of time is necessary, 
because conception is not caused simultaneously with the marital embrace. 
Rather, the subsequent natural processes are necessary to bring about 
conception, and these subsequent natural processes occur over a span of 
time. 
ii. Logical Continuity Derived from Efficient Causality 
The second type of continuity of the causal chain is a logical 
continuity derived from efficient causality. This type of continuity of the 
causal chain is linked to the temporal continuity of the causal chain . In this 
type of logical continuity of a causal chain, one sees a series of distinct 
causal events, but each one is linked back to the initial causal action of the 
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human person. For example, someone has set up hundreds of dominos so 
arranged that one push will topple them all. Such an event really is a series 
of many causal events. The person pushes the first domino over. That 
event, even though it ceases after the first domino has fallen , causes the 
next domino to fall, and that event of falling, even though it ceases, causes 
the next to fall , and so on. The falling of each domino, though in itself a 
distinct causal event, can be traced back to the initial push without which 
none of the dominos would fall. That initial push is the cause of all the 
dominos falling, from the first to the last. The logical continuity refers to 
this whole series of events initiated by the first cause, or push of the first 
domino.75 
If for some reason this whole chain of events were stopped, the first 
push would no longer be exerting its causal influence. Perhaps the 
dominos were not set up properly, and, because there was too much space 
between two of them, the falling of one domino did not cause the next one 
to fall. Everything stopped . Perhaps another person intervened and set up 
an obstacle between two dominos to prevent the falling of one to cause the 
falling of the other. Everything stopped. If this happened, then in order for 
the last domino in the line to fall , someone would have to push again . If 
this were the case, the first push could not be the cause of the falling of the 
last domino. The second push would be the cause of the falling of the last 
domino. The initial causal action, the initial pushing of the first domino, 
could no longer be considered the principal cause of the last effect, the 
falling of the last domino. 
Herman Reith provides a good description of this type of logical 
continuity found in a series of causes . 
An effect may be produced by an arrangement of primary and 
secondary causes in what is called a per se subordinate series of proper 
causes. Their series has the following characteristics: the secondary 
causes cannot act except as members of the series, even though they 
have a nature that is properly a principle of movement; each member of 
the series affects the total effect; each cause in the series has a mode of 
causation proper to its nature; there must be a limited number of these 
causes, a first in the series, and this is not dependent upon other causes 
but the others are dependent upon it. 
In accord with the principle of causality, if there were no first 
cause to which the effect can ultimately be traced, there would be no 
effect at all. The other members of the series cannot by themselves 
produce the effect, since intermediate causes operate not only in virtue 
of their own nature but require in addition the influence of a superior 
cause. If all causes were intermediate causes, even if there were an 
infinite series of such causes, there would not be in the series a 
August, 2000 47 
sufficient explanation of the effect that takes place. Only the presence 
in the series of a cause that is universally the source of the total line of 
causality will explain the effect.76 
Such a line of causality can be seen from the conjugal act to conception. 
The conjugal act is the first cause (the principal cause) in the series. The 
intermediate causes in the series are the natural processes. These natural 
processes have a mode of causation proper to their nature. They lead to 
and so influence the final effect, but they can do so only as a part of the 
series. They are dependent upon the conjugal act as the first cause in the 
series and so assist the conjugal act, because their own proper mode of 
causation could not lead to conception unless it was initiated by another 
cause. If these natural processes were initiated by a cause other than the 
conjugal act, they would be subordinate to the cause that initiated the series 
and not the conjugal act. Thus, the effect (conception) would ultimately be 
explained by the cause that initiated the series, which would be, then, the 
principal cause of conception. 
For example, one of the natural processes subsequent to the conjugal 
act is the natural motility of the sperm; this is a type of causation proper to 
its nature. The natural motility of the sperm can lead to and so influence 
the final effect of conception only as a part of a series of causal events that 
is initiated by another cause. The natural motility of the sperm, as well as 
the other natural causal processes, are dependent upon the cause that 
initiates the series, and so that cause is the principal cause of conception. If 
the conjugal act initiates this series of natural causal processes, it is the 
principal cause of conception. If a reproductive technology initiates this 
series of natural causal processes, it is the principal cause of conception. 
The conjugal act initiates a whole series of causal events leading to 
conception, and both the temporal continuity and the logical continuity 
derived from efficient causality must be preserved for the conjugal act to be 
the principal cause of conception. If the natural processes subsequent to 
intercourse and leading to conception were stopped and then started again 
by a technical intervention, the conjugal act would no longer be the 
principal cause of conception. The technical intervention that starts the 
processes anew would be the principal cause of conception, for the natural 
causal processes would be dependent upon the technical intervention in 
bringing about conception and not the conjugal act. 
Cataldo overlooks this type of causal continuity of the natural 
processes. He insists that the line must be drawn at the immediate causal 
factors that are natural. He believes that if one does not draw the line there , 
any intervention subsequent to intercourse would be considered a 
replacement of the conjugal act. 77 Yet this is not so. A subsequent 
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intervention usurps the principal causality of the conjugal act if it stops this 
series of natural causal events, or if it initiates this series of natural causal 
events by itself or anew. Thus, it is possible to have a subsequent 
intervention that still assists the conjugal act, provided that, even though it 
might modifY or affect this natural causal chain to some extent, it does not 
stop this causal chain of events or it does not initiate this causal chain of 
events by itself or anew. 
iii. Logical Continuity Derived from Final Causality 
There is a third type of continuity of a causal chain, another type of 
logical continuity, this one derived from final causality. Take the example 
of a contractor building a house. He initiates many causal actions to 
complete construction of the house and each one is united by the same goal, 
the construction of the house. With respect to the same goal, all these 
individual causal actions fall under the one activity of building the house. 
In fact it does not matter how many individual actions or agents are 
involved, provided that they are all united under the same goal. The 
contractor might engage several subcontractors for different parts of the 
work, pouring the foundation, plumbing, wiring, etc. By the logical unity 
flowing from the same goal of building the house, all these actions fall 
under the one activity of building the house.78 
This type of logical continuity is necessary for the continuity of the 
causal chain. If the end is changed to something else, the continuity is 
broken. If one soccer player passes the ball to a second player to score a 
goal, but the second player turns traitor and passes the ball to the opposing 
team so that the opposing team might score, the continuity is broken.79 
Though this type of logical continuity is necessary to preserve the 
continuity of a causal chain, by itself it is not sufficient. Temporal 
continuity and the logical continuity derived from efficient causality are 
also necessary. This was seen above in the discussion of McCarthy' s and 
Grisez's moral analysis of GIFT/TOTS. They hold that there must be a 
moral unity derived from the end between the conjugal act and the 
technical intervention. Grisez proposes that as long as there is a true 
conjugal act, and as long as the semen used is deposited in the vagina and 
then removed, the subsequent technical interventions are said to assist the 
conjugal act in achieving conception insofar as they share in the same goal 
as the conjugal act, achieving conception. If, however, the goals of the 
subsequent interventions are diverse from the conjugal act, for example, 
delaying conception to another time or experimentation, the technical 
interventions can no longer be said to assist the conjugal act. Grisez rightly 
observes that the sameness of end must be maintained, but he overlooks 
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that the logical continuity derived from efficient causality and the temporal 
continuity of the natural causal processes initiated with the conjugal act, as 
well as the next type of continuity to be discussed, must also be preserved. 
iv. The Continuity between Principal Cause and Effect 
The final type of continuity of a causal chain IS based on the 
distinction between principal and assisting causes. There must be 
continuity between the principal cause and the effect. To maintain this 
continuity, the principal cause must be chiefly responsible for bringing 
about the effect, and the assisting cause must playa subordinate role in 
bringing about the effect. Otherwise, the "principal cause" is no longer the 
principal cause.80 
Seifert, unfortunately, does not clarity how one determines which 
cause is chiefly responsible for bringing about the effect, and which cause 
is subordinate. This determination, in fact, is difficult. Instead, he 
provides examples of assisting causes. An assisting cause is one that 
provides the means that render possible the effects of the principal cause or 
removes obstacles to the principal cause so that it may carry out its action. 
For example, the use of artificial fallopian tubes to replace the obstructed 
ones or the introduction of slippery S mucus into the vagina would render 
possible the effects of the conjugal act. 81 
The evaluation other authors provide of GIFT/TOTS, if further 
developed, can illustrate another way to determine whether something is a 
principal or assisting cause. Donald DeMarco, Benedict Ashley, Kevin 
O'Rourke, William May, and John Haas observe that when GIFT/TOTS is 
employed, the conjugal act is merely incidental to the achievement of 
pregnancy, for it is only a means to obtain sperm. The procedure could be 
employed successfully without the conjugal act at all , provided that the 
sperm is obtained in some way other than the conjugal act. 82 Thus, they 
implicitly propose the following criterion: There must be an essential link 
between the conjugal act and the technical means employed, that is, the 
conjugal act must not be merely incidental to the success of the technical 
means employed. Thus, any technical means that does not have such an 
essential bond with the conjugal act replaces it. The child conceived would 
be the fruit of the technical means, because the conjugal act remains only 
incidental to the whole process. Based on this criterion, These authors 
judge GIFT/TOTS to be illicit. In GIFT/TOTS, the conjugal act is merely 
incidental to the process. It is only employed to obtain sperm. It has no 
essential link to the technical process. 
This criterion is straightforward and quite helpful. Yet a notion of 
causality, namely the distinction between principal cause and assisting 
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cause, must be considered. In light of this further elaboration, one can then 
see how helpful indeed this criterion is for determining whether something 
is a principal or assisting cause. As already discussed, the child conceived 
must be the fruit of the conjugal act. A technical means may assist the 
conjugal act. So the conjugal act must be the principal cause of 
conception, and any technical means must be the assisting cause of 
conception. A principal cause is necessary and primarily responsible for 
bringing about the effect. An assisting cause plays a subordinate role in 
bringing about the effect. It is not always easy to determine which cause is 
primary and which cause is subordinate in bringing about the effect. 
However, if the conjugal act remains only incidental to the whole process, 
and if the technical means could be employed successfully without it, then 
the conjugal act cannot be the principal cause of conception. Having 
examined this notion of causality to develop further this criterion, one 
might elaborate the criterion in this way: If the conjugal act is merely 
incidental to the technical means employed, that is, if the technical means 
can be employed successfully without it, the conjugal act can no longer be 
considered the principal cause of conception. It has been replaced by the 
technical means. Though this criterion elaborates a necessary condition for 
determining whether a technical intervention plays a subordinate role to the 
conjugal act, it is not sufficient to determine whether the technology plays a 
subordinate role in all cases. It may be possible, for example, that a 
reproductive technology requires the conjugal act to be successful, but the 
conjugal act might still play the subordinate role in bringing about 
conception. 
There is another way in which other human agents as causes may be 
said to be assisting causes to the principal cause who is another human 
agent. To elucidate this, one may return to the example of the contractor 
who is building a house. He employs several subcontractors in building 
this house. All of the people involved share in the same end and hence the 
same activity of building the house. The contractor himself may do the 
minority of the actual labor of building, but he could still be considered the 
principal cause of the house insofar as all the subcontractors are working 
under his direction. In this way he plays the primary role in bringing about 
the house, and the subcontractors playa subordinate role. 
These types of principal and assisting causes, in which other human 
agents assist the principal human agent insofar as they are under the 
principal's overall direction, is also evident in the use of reproductive 
technologies. For example, a married couple has difficulty conceiving and 
employs doctors and technicians to carry out the GIFT/TOTS procedure. 
Insofar as the couple has initiated this procedure and sees to its overall 
direction, they could be considered the principal causes of the resulting 
August, 2000 51 
conception, and the doctors and technicians the assisting causes. However, 
this does not mean that the procedure assists the conjugal act! The 
doctors and technicians may be assisting the spouses to achieve conception 
in this way, but they may not be assisting the spouses to achieve conception 
by assisting the conjugal act to achieve conception. This type of assisting 
causality in which other human agents are under the direction of a principal 
human agent does not guarantee that the conjugal act is assisted. 
Magisterial teaching indicates that the conjugal act of the spouses may be 
assisted but not replaced. It is not simply a matter of just assisting the 
spouses in achieving conception. 
v. Summary 
In sum, it is seen why there must not be a break in the continuity of 
the natural causal processes which are subsequent to intercourse and which 
lead to conception. The conjugal act must be the principal cause of 
conception, and it exercises this causality through a natural causal process 
or a natural causal chain. The conjugal act and the subsequent natural 
causal processes are intimately I inked in bringing about conception. 
Conception would not occur without either. In the marital embrace, the 
spouses initiate a whole series of natural causal events that may continue 
for days before conception may result. 
Thus, for the conjugal act to exercise its causality in bringing about 
conception, it must do so by initiating a natural causal process. By 
examining how principal causes work through a series of subordinate 
causes, it has been seen that if the continuity of the causal process is 
interrupted, then the initial cause can no longer be considered the principal 
cause. Seifert proposes four aspects to the continuity of the process: 
temporal continuity, logical continuity derived from efficient causality, 
logical continuity derived from final causality, and the continuity derived 
from the link between the principal cause and the effect. If any aspect of 
this continuity is broken , the initial cause of the process can no longer be 
considered the principal cause of the final effect. 
It seems, though, that the first two aspects of the continuity of the 
causal process can be reduced to one. If there is ever a complete temporal 
hiatus in the causal process, the first initial cause has stopped exerting its 
influence, and likewise, then, the logical link between the cause initiating 
the process and all the subsequent causal events in the series is sundered. 
Any intervening cause starting the process again would then become the 
principal cause of the final effect of the process, for the initial cause would 
no longer be exerting its causal influence. Thus, Seifert ' s first two aspects 
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of the continuity of the causal process wi II be considered as one, that is, the 
continuity derived from efficient causality. 
There remain then, two additional aspects of continuity. If a 
subsequent, intervening cause does not share in the same goal as the initial 
cause that started the process, it cannot be considered to assist the initial 
cause. The continuity of the process is thus broken. Finally, if any 
subsequent cause does not playa subordinate role in bringing about the 
final effect of the causal chain, but rather is primarily responsible for 
bringing about the final effect, then the continuity between the cause 
initiating the process and the final effect has been broken insofar as that 
first initiating cause cannot be considered the principal cause of the final 
effect of the causal chain. Thus, any investigation into assistance or 
replacement must examine whether the three aspects of the continuity of 
the causal chain are respected: (I) continuity derived from efficient 
causality, (2) continuity derived from final causality, and (3) continuity 
derived from the link between principal cause and effect. 
B. The Criteria to Determine Whether a Reproductive Technology 
Assists or Replaces the Conjugal Act. 
In light of this discussion, it is quite clear that there are two basic 
criteria to determine whether a reproductive technology assists or replaces 
the conjugal act: /) There must be a natural conjugal act open to life. 2) 
The child conceived must be the fruit of the conjugal act; that is, the 
conjugal act must be the principle cause of conception. These criteria are 
clearly indicated in Donum Vitae. It is clear and easy to determine whether 
the first criterion is met. Yet, how does one determine whether the child 
conceived is the fruit of the conjugal act? How does one determine 
whether the conjugal act is the principal cause of conception? In light of 
the previous discussion, I propose the following criteria to determine 
whether a reproductive technology replaces the conjugal act as the 
principal cause of conception . 
a) The conjugal act remains the principal cause of conception if the 
technical means only enables it to be performed. 
b) The conjugal act remains the principal cause of conception if the 
technical means only removes obstacles that prevent the conjugal act from 
being effective, or if it only provides a means for the conjugal act to be 
effective. In other words, the conjugal act remains the principal cause of 
conception if the technical means only provides the active condition(s) for 
the conjugal act to exercise its own principal causality. 
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c) The conjugal act is not the principal cause of conception if the natural 
causal chain initiated by the conjugal act and leading to conception is 
interrupted by the technical means, that is, if the continuity derived from 
efficient causality is violated. 
i.) The natural causal process IS interrupted if the technical means 
stops it. 
ii .) The natural causal process is interrupted if the sperm are removed 
from the woman's body after the conjugal act has taken place. 
iii.) The natural causal process is interrupted if conception occurs 
outside the woman's body. 
iv.) The natural causal process is interrupted if the technical means 
initiates the process anew once it has been stopped, or if the technical 
means, instead of the conjugal act, initiates the natural causal chain 
leading to conception. 
d) The technical means does not assist the conjugal act if it does not share 
in the same goal as the conjugal act, that is, if it violates the second aspect 
of the continuity of the causal process, the continuity derived from final 
causality. 
e) The conjugal act is not the principal cause of conception if it is merely 
incidental to the technical intervention, or if the technical means plays the 
primary and not the subordinate role in causing conception . This would be 
a violation of the third aspect of the continuity of the causal process, the 
continuity derived from the link between principal cause and effect. 
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i.) The conjugal act is incidental to the technical means if it merely 
serves as a means to obtain sperm. 
ii.) The conjugal act is incidental to the technical means if it does not 
require the conjugal act, that is, if the procedure can be successful 
without the conjugal act. 
iii .) The conjugal act is incidental to the technical means if the 
gametes used by the procedure to obtain conception do not pertain to 
the conjugal act. The gametes do not pertain to the conjugal act if the 
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sperm used in the procedure are intentionally withheld from the 
conjugal act, or the ova are removed prior to the conjugal act. 
A definition of assistance and replacement of the conjugal act can 
now be proposed. Assistance to the conjugal act is any means that enables 
the conjugal act to be performed, or any means that enables the conjugal 
act to exercise its principal causality in achieving conception, either by 
removing obstacles to the causal activity of the conjugal act or by 
supplying its own causal activity that does not violate any of the three 
aspects of the continuity of the causal process between the conjugal act and 
conception. Replacement of the conjugal act is any means used to achieve 
conception that becomes the principal cause of conception, either because 
it does not entail the conjugal act at all, or because it violates any of the 
three aspects of the continuity of the causal process between the conjugal 
act and conception. 
C. Application of the Criteria to Selected Reproductive Technologies 
To better understand these criteria to determine assistance and 
replacement, they will now be applied in a moral evaluation of a few 
selected reproductive technologies, Low Tubal Ovum Transfer (L TOT), 
Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT) or Tubal Ovum Transfer with 
Sperm (TOTS), Intrauterine Insemination (lUI), and two methods that have 
been proposed to help with a husband 's sperm deficiency. 
L TOT can be described in this way: 
This procedure . . . transfers only the woman's egg. The egg is 
collected by laparoscopy and replaced for fertilization in the lower 
portion of the fallopian tube close to the uterus. The couple engages in 
sexual intercourse before and after replacement of the egg.83 . 
This procedure assists the conjugal act and so could be licit. It meets the 
following criteria for determining assistance and replacement. There is a 
true and proper conjugal act (I). The conjugal act is necessary for the 
success of the procedure (2-e). The procedure does not interrupt the causal 
chain of natural processes initiated by the conjugal act (2-c), because it 
does not stop the causal chain (2-c-i), the sperm are not removed from the 
mother' s body after intercourse and then later reintroduced (2-c-ii), 
fertilization occurs within the mother' s body (2-c-iii), and it does not 
initiate the <,:ausal chain anew (2-c-iv). Finally, the procedure removes 
obstacles to the conjugal act and so allows it to be effective (2-b). 
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Perhaps a bit of explanation of how it meets the criteria "2-b" and "2-
c" will help. Why does L TOT not interrupt the causal chain? The ovum is 
removed from the mother' s body after the first act of intercourse. Why 
does not the removal of the ovum subsequent to intercourse interrupt the 
causal chain; whereas, removal of the sperm after intercourse interrupts of 
causal chain? There is a disturbance in the normal natural processes. The 
release of the ovum from the ovary and its movement into the fallopian 
tube is a natural process of the mother' s body. Yet it is not properly part of 'i 
the causal activity initiated by the conjugal act. It occurs periodically 
whether there is a conjugal act or not. Thus, complete stop, disruption, 
alteration, or substitution of this natural process of the ovum' s release and 
migration down the fallopian tube does not disrupt the natural causal chain, 
which is initiated by the conjugal act, so as to displace the conjugal act as 
the principal cause of conception. Instead, this natural process of the 
mother' s body supplies a condition for the conjugal act to be successful by 
supplying an ovum to fertilize. Similarly in LTOT, the transfer of the 
ovum past blockage in the fallopian tube, even though it modifies or 
substitutes a natural process, supplies an active condition (criterion 2-b) for 
the conjugal act to be successful. It in no way usurps the principal 
causality of the conjugal act. 
GIFT/TOTS can be described in this way. The ova are obtained by 
laparoscopy. The sperm are collected after intercourse using a perforated 
silastic sheath, or from the vagina or cervix, and then "washed." The 
gametes are placed in a catheter separated by an air bubble or culture 
medium and then injected into the fallopian tube .84 
This procedure replaces the conjugal act because it violates the 
following criteria. The conjugal act is incidental to the procedure (2-e) 
insofar as it merely serves as a means to supply sperm (2-e-i), insofar as the 
procedure can be successful without the conjugal act (2-e-ii), and, 
depending upon how GIFT/TOTS is employed, insofar as the gametes used 
by the procedure to achieve conception do not pertain to the conjugal act 
(2-e-iii). In addition, the procedure breaks the natural causal chain initiated 
by the conjugal act (2-c), because it stops it (2-c-i), because it removes the 
sperm from the mother' s body (2-c-ii), and because it initiates the causal 
chain anew (2-c-iv). Thus GIFT/TOTS is morally illicit. 
lUI is a type of artificial insemination in which the sperm are washed 
and then deposited in the uterine cavity by means of a catheter.85 Cataldo 
suggests a modified version of this procedure that he judges could be 
morally licit. In this modified version, the sperm are collected with a 
perforated silastic sheath used in a conjugal act. They are then "washed" 
and deposited in the uterine cavity by means of a catheter.86 
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The moral evaluation of this modified version of lUI is similar to 
GIFT/TOTS. It replaces the conjugal act because it violates the following 
criteria. The conjugal act is incidental to the procedure (2-e) insofar as it 
merely serves as a means to supply sperm (2-e-i), insofar as the procedure 
can be successful without the conjugal act (2-e-ii), and insofar as the 
gametes used to achieve conception do not pertain to the conjugal act (2-e-
iii). In addition, the procedure breaks the natural causal chain initiated by 
the conjugal act (2-c), because it stops it (2-c-i), because it removes the 
sperm from the mother's body (2-c-ii), and because it initiates the causal 
chain anew (2-c-iv). Thus, even this modified form of lUI is morally illicit 
for it replaces the conjugal act. 
Finally, two methods have been proposed to help a husband with 
sperm deficiency. Thomas O'Donnell, SJ has proposed this method to help 
achieve conception when the husband suffers from oligospermia. 
Oligospermia (a deficiency of sufficient spermatozoa in the 
husband's ejaculate) may be overcome by collecting amounts of the 
husband ' s ejaculate in acts of natural intercourse with a perforated 
condom, which can be observed and spun down in the laboratory to 
obtain a residue with a heavy concentration of sperm which can be 
deposited artificially within the generative tract of the wife either 
immediately before or after a normal act of intercourse, thus fortifying 
the ejaculate of that act of intercourse with supplemental sperm 
previously collected in legitimate marital acts. 87 
Nicholas Tonti-Filippini has proposed a similar procedure for another 
circumstance. 
A man who had become steri Ie from some form of therapy, such 
as for carcinoma, might have had the foresight to freeze his 0\\11 sperm 
(having been licitly obtained), prior to the therapy. The sperm might 
then be used by the spouses in the context of the conjugal act, knowing 
that the ejaculate was sterile, but adding to it the previously stored 
sample.88 
These methods replace the conjugal act because they violate the 
following criterion. The conjugal act is incidental to the procedure (2-e) 
because the procedure could be successfully employed without it (2-e-ii). 
What really takes place here is an act of artificial insemination that just 
happens to be accompanied by an act of intercourse. These methods could 
be successful without the accompanying act of intercourse. Because 
intercourse is merely incidental to the success of conception, it cannot be 
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considered the principal cause of conception. Thus, these methods are 
morally illicit. 
Conclusion 
This investigation began with a question. How does one determine 
whether a reproductive technology assists or replaces the conjugal act? As 
a result, an effort was made to propose criteria by which one can 
distinguish assistance from replacement. Was this investigation 
successful? Was the question that began this investigation answered? Yes 
and no. The question has been answered, but still more development would 
be helpful. This investigation has articulated a better understanding of 
assistance and replacement. It has proposed useful criteria to determine 
whether a reproductive technology assists or replaces the conjugal act. Yet 
further development would be helpful to apply better the Church's 
teaching. A deeper understanding of ways to distinguish principal and 
assisting causes could foster an improved articulation of criterion 2-e, the 
criterion which is based on the continuity of the causal process that is 
derived from the link between principal cause and effect. If one has a 
deeper understanding of principal and assisting causes, one can determine 
better when another cause usurps the principal causality of the conjugal act. 
In addition, a further analysis might help to determine how a causal process 
is stopped, that is, how the continuity of the causal process that is derived 
from efficient causality is violated. This could foster an improved 
articulation of criterion 2-c . 
In conclusion, the human person should stand in awe and wonder at 
the mystery of human life, at the mystery of God 's creative gift of human 
life. Contemplation of God ' s ineffable self-gift in creating leads to deeper 
understanding, deeper esteem, and deeper reverence for all human persons, 
for all human life. Only from this interior disposition permeated with 
Divine Wisdom, should all decisions about reproductive technologies be 
made. "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he 
created him; male and female he created them" (Gn. I: 27). 
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